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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, 
Geacht College van Decanen, 
Distinguished Colleagues, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
 
 
It is with great honour and pleasure that I accept the appointment as Full Professor 
of cross-cultural management at the Rotterdam School of Management / 
Faculteit Bedrijfskunde of Erasmus University Rotterdam by giving this inaugural 
address entitled East, West, Best: Cross  Cultural Encounters and Measures. 
 
Introduction 
 
A Dutch proverb (Oost, west, thuis best) in the title of the present address draws 
our attention to a common sense notion of differences between various human 
groups, organizations and societies. Societies, far and close, differ. Pascal has 
already noted that a truth on one side of the Pyrenees becomes a lie on the other. 
Most of us have been brought up believing that things are different north, south, 
east and west, but here, at home, wherever that might be, one knows what is best, 
or at least better. It is one of the many missions of a university in a contemporary 
society to question common sense knowledge, to examine the unexamined beliefs 
and to expose the tacit values at the bottom of our hearts and minds. A critical 
analysis of the proverb in question would quickly reveal that there are many 
Easts, not all of them eastern, that there are many Wests, not all of them 
western, and that there are many bests, not always better than the others. Some 
solutions to some problems can appear better  but not always, not everywhere 
and not for everybody. Not all bests will appear better than their predecessors, 
alternatives, or successors upon a closer examination, especially after some time. 
Who should perform a critical analysis of Easts, Wests and Bests? Following the 
iron laws of the political economy of our divided attention such analysis is being 
performed daily by journalists in mass media and by individual citizens in their 
daily lives as students, patients, consumers, tourists, family raisers, believers or 
workers. Common sense becomes common sense because it is common, not 
necessarily because it makes sense. It is up to us, members of an academic 
profession, to make sense of making sense and to indicate why some of these ways 
are so commonly accepted as to result in the common sense beliefs, which guide 
humans in their behaviour and prompt their routines.  
 
Needless to say, we are not unrestrained in our critical attempts. The structure and 
pace of scientific revolutions vary. Scientists and scholars can be stuck with a 
dictatorship of a paradigmatic proletariat and threatened with an exile of dissidents 
to virtual cyberias. The evolution of paradigms developed by scholarly 
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communities for producing knowledge (with an academic trademark and a 
university logo proudly attached to the publications) can accelerate so quickly that 
all that is solid melts into thin air and a sort of an anarchy (a kind of a 
Feyerabendian epistemological dadaism)(1) is loosened upon the academic world. 
Between the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of relativism we hope to 
manage research, gather data, develop explanations and interpretations and 
provide some measure of guidance to many recipients of our services, disclosed 
and undisclosed.  
 
It is one of the most fascinating experiences of our profession to watch a new 
domain of knowledge emerge out of a struggle to understand Easts, Wests and 
Bests  and to change the edifice of social sciences by doing so. The 
undersigned hopes to convince you that the emergence of cross-cultural studies is 
precisely such a case in point. Empirical research designed and conducted by 
Geert Hofstede helped define a new domain, endowing it with the theoretical 
concept of cultural dimensions (at the expense of social psychology)(2), while a 
theoretical model of advanced rationalization presented by George Ritzer linked it 
to the post-Weberian critical sociology (at the expense of sociology pur sang)(3). 
The development of critical theories of management  once a risky venture 
attracting historians of the Frankfurt school such as Martin Jay or students of 
organizational communications such as Mats Alvesson  is certainly much more 
advanced now than it was in 1988 when this university hosted an international 
conference attended by the abovementioned colleagues (and organized by the 
undersigned with his Dutch colleague, Frits van Engeldorp Gastelaars). Chairs in 
cross-cultural management in schools of business are being created either within 
the organizational sciences or within a new field called communications. It is not a 
smooth process. Organizational sciences are already fighting protracted border 
wars against the representatives of strategic and knowledge management studies. 
The latter have territorial claims against organizational scientists. Is this academic 
war of independence, a struggle for the recognition of a new branch of knowledge, 
for the creation of a new academic nation-state, for the acknowledgement of a new 
sub-discipline, a just and legitimate struggle? 
 
 
 
Two cases: encounters past and present 
 
Before answering this question let us imagine that we have designed a virtual 
reality game. Time: XVth century. Place: Territorial waters of eastern and western 
Africa. Name of the game: explore and exploit. Along the western coasts of Africa 
- European sailors and traders slowly make their way towards the southern tip of 
the dark continent. Their ships fly first Portuguese, then Spanish and later Dutch or 
British flags. They land, contact local rulers, establish trading posts, move 
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forward, come back to Europe with spoils, then return and press southwards, 
looking for a sea route leading to Chinese silk and to Indian spices. Meanwhile, 
along Africas eastern shore, the Arabs have already established their trading posts 
and the Chinese are sending their fleets. They also land, contact local rulers, 
establish trading posts, move forward, looking for new exotic gifts to the emperor 
 a giraffe, for instance, or a rhinoceros. Let us freeze the game around 1414 and 
consult the experts. Who has better chances of winning this game? Who will 
control the trading posts along the African coast and the sea link between a 
prosperous China and a conflict-torn Europe? Here is what an expert could have 
written if asked by the World Bank to advise them whether to invest in the 
European or the Chinese enterprise: 
 
A huge fleet left port in 1414 and sailed westward on a voyage of trade and 
exploration. The undertaking far surpassed anything Columbus, Isabela and 
Ferdinand could have envisioned. The fleet included at least sixty-two massive 
trading galleons, any of which could have held Columbus s three small ships on 
its decks. The largest galleons were more than 400 feet long and 150 feet wide (the 
Santa Maria, Columbuss largest vessel, was about 90 by 30 feet), and each could 
carry about 1,500 tons (Columbuss ships combined could carry about 400 tons). 
More than 100 smaller vessels accompanied the galleons. All told, 30,000 people 
went on the voyage, compared with Columbuss crew of ninety-some. The 
commanders name was Zheng He, the Grand Eunuch of the three Treasures and 
the most acclaimed admiral of the Ming dynasty.(4) 
 
Let us imagine that the World Bank sends this expertise to another expert for a 
second opinion and let us assume that the person in question is a specialist in 
cross-cultural management. Would his or her opinion coincide with the one of 
their predecessor? It might. Should the second expert make use of the analysis 
based on the Hofstedian dimensions of culture, with a stress on Confucian 
dynamism and an ability to think in terms of long-term plans  he or she might 
still arrive at the same conclusion. Chinese can focus on long-term stability and 
are not pressed so hard for a quick return on investment. Ergo, they will be much 
more prudent, rational and successful in  the long run. Chinese can organize and 
manage their collective ventures much more efficiently and without internal 
rivalry. Ergo, they will be less wasteful and will enjoy higher profits. They are 
more skilled in games and gambling, which should give them an edge in risk-
taking and development of financial institutions.  
 
But an expert in question might also notice the possibility of a different 
interpretation. The focus on long-term stability could prevent the Chinese from 
exploiting the windows of opportunity on a short-term basis and undermine their 
competitiveness in the long term. The collective harmonization of activities could 
prevent them from developing individual initiative and exploring individual 
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opportunities, leaving the Europeans free to do so. Technological and managerial 
superiority might prompt their inward turn and a decline of interest in foreign 
affairs. The expert in cross-cultural comparisons would possibly discover what a 
famous Dutch football player has expressed in an immortal formula that every 
advantage has its disadvantage as the underside. The same values which helped 
the Chinese build and sustain a large empire with advanced technology, with a 
productive agrobusiness feeding a huge population and with a highly skilled 
professional bureaucracy standardizing communications  the same values locked 
the empire in a prison of relative and temporary success. As long as world 
communications remained relatively unimportant in managing the local business 
of large societies, the Chineses values were a recipe for success. However, as 
soon as the frequency of cross-cultural contacts increased  the criteria of a 
successful competition also began to change. An emergent world-wide system 
started to reward bellicose individualist adventurers from Europe  at the expense 
of everybody else. Neither the geographical proximity of the Arabs to their eastern 
African trading posts nor the technological superiority of the Chinese sufficed to 
defeat their European rivals.  
 
Should our expert have furnished the World Bank with this critical opinion, a 
position of cross-cultural studies among managerial sciences would have been 
safe. However, sceptics can notice that forecasts and predictions are harder with 
respect to the future than to the past. Should experts in cross-cultural management 
hope for relevance, they have to risk forecasting, let us say, the future of 
globalization. Forecasts about the future of globalization available on the academic 
markets fall into two basic categories. First, there is a mainstream literature on 
one market under God(5) and on the inevitability and progressive nature of 
globalizing processes.(6)  Globalization, in other words, is a continuation of 
modernizing policies by other means. Second, there is a number of highly critical 
analyses of the effects of globalization by sociologists (7), representatives of 
political economy (8) and by political scientists (9). The above duality is reflected 
in annual ritual clashes of the representatives of the global establishment (IMF, 
WB, WTO, G-8, etc.) and their police forces with the opponents of globalization 
on the streets of Seattle, Washington, Prague, Quebec or Genoa. Clearly, the 
representatives of the world institutions do not share values and beliefs with those 
who want to disrupt their proceedings or at least to change the approach, to modify 
the agenda, to redraw the priorities. Can experts in cross-cultural management add 
something relevant to this debate?  
 
They can and they do by indicating the ways in which culture matters in shaping 
the choices of groups and individuals with respect to the alternative aims of 
possible actions and the organizational means available. They can do so by simply 
assuming that culturally dominant western societies and organizations should 
offer a natural basis for comparison. This is the way chosen by those who compare 
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the values and institutions of the political and economic elites in South America 
and Africa to the values of the US and Western European ones(10).  This is the 
way chosen by those who conduct international research projects measuring  for 
instance - the national leadership styles and comparing them to one another. They 
can do so in a more self-critical manner. They can namely try avoiding the pro-
western bias by relating comparative analysis to a critical theory of social 
processes, for instance to a Wallersteinian theory of world-systems or to a theory 
of social movements. In this latter case they can try to explain mass protests 
against globalization as the emergence of new social movements proposing new 
values and looking for new, alternative governance structures and communication 
patterns, prompted by new inequalities and new exclusions resulting from the 
globalizing developments.  
 
They might even draw upon the imaginary case about the Euro-Chinese rivalry 
around Africa after 1414 and quote king Nzinga Mbemba of Congo who argued in 
the letter to the king of Portugal sent in 1526 that slave trade must stop: 
 
because it is our will that in these kingdoms of Congo there should be not any 
trade in slaves nor any market for slaves.(11) 
 
They may point out that a Christian king of Portugal must have treated this letter 
as just another example of a parochial prejudice of ignorant natives, who failed to 
understand that trade was good for them. They may suggest another approach to 
what appears as a stumbling block on the way to successful globalization  for 
instance, angry demonstrators and concerned scientists. They may try to 
understand what Adam Smith would have called moral sentiments and 
contemporary economists like to call social capital (which prevents us from 
bowling alone) or even trust (which prevents us from cheating in market 
transactions). They may try to explain the birth of individual and group values as 
an emergence of a belief that some ends and some combinations of ends and 
means are right and natural (for instance, human rights and the means of 
safeguarding them, or rights of women or of the ethnic, religious, demographic or 
sexual minorities). They may indicate the necessity to involve the excluded 
protesters in a plethora of modern, electronically mediated agoras.  They may 
stress the necessity to make global elites aware of their institutional biases. They 
may point to the increasing price societies are paying for non-transparent and non-
democratic forms of corporate governance. They may be the first to notice the 
cultural significance of the victory of the South African government in the struggle 
against global pharmaceutical corporations  a struggle for medicines slowing 
down the development of full blown AIDS. They may notice that a critical theory 
of cross-cultural competence has to be interdisciplinary and critical of global 
influences exerted by emergent networks of states, markets and other institutions:  
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Modern world culture is more than a simple set of ideas or values diffusing and 
operating separately in individual sentiments in each society The power of 
modern culture  like that of medieval Christendom  lies in the fact that it is a 
shared and binding set of rules exogeneous to any given society, and located not 
only in individual sentiments, but also in many world institutions.(12) 
 
This sample quotation hints at the relevance of cross-cultural studies. However, to 
maintain relevance, our expert should be able to demonstrate that his or her 
expertise also offers a methodological advantage in the research community and a 
pragmatic advantage in society at large. Is this feasible? Can he or she do it? Can 
he or she offer an edible pudding, which can find its proof in the eating? 
 
 
 
Measuring cultural relativity: a methodological comment  
 
Nobel-prize winning economist Amartya Sen has once criticized a tacit 
assumption (resulting from the Western political, economic and cultural 
dominance in the contemporary world) that Western civilization has a virtual 
monopoly on rationalist and liberal ideas. When commenting on a routine bias 
involved in identifying and defining cross-cultural differences by contrasting other 
cultures and traditions with the modern Western ones, he wrote that: 
 
The West is seen, in effect, as having exclusive access to the values that lie at the 
foundation of rationality and reasoning, science and evidence, liberty and 
tolerance, and of course rights and justice(13) 
 
While this normative assumption and a biased approach to a comparative, cross-
cultural analysis are relatively easy to detect, a methodological bias is much harder 
to tackle. A postmodernist critique of the grand narratives has contributed to the 
focus of social scientists on the methodological bias of a rational choice theory. 
The persistence of rational choice theory as the methodological starting point gave 
homo economicus a privileged status in academic social sciences. A model of a 
rational subject has been privileged compared to a homo sociologicus or a 
homo sentiens, in spite of the fact that an explanation of either individual and 
group identity or of the structuring of institutional and normative framework for 
action requires an equal access to all three conceptualizations of the human agent, 
with special stress on the third one. Perceived as homo economicus, a man or 
woman calculates and makes choices according to the principles of instrumental 
rationality, perceived as homo sociologicus he or she follows social norms 
reflecting his or her embededness in groups and communities, and perceived as 
homo sentiens he or she expresses his or her identity as a person moved by 
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deepest concerns and moral commitments, able to use cultural resources in his 
or her own way.  While economists focus on homo economicus and sociologists 
train their sights on homo sociologicus, cross-cultural researchers are slowly 
replacing novelists, theologians and film-makers as students of homo sentiens. As 
Margaret Archer succinctly puts it: 
 
Webers Wertrationalität, far from being expelled from a disenchanted world, 
remains part of our lifeworld, which cannot be reduced to the bargain-hunters 
bazaar.(14) 
 
This is the source of the immense popularity enjoyed by the theoretical construct 
of the dimensions of culture created by Geert Hofstede. Hofstedian dimensions of 
culture owe their popularity among social scientists in general and among the 
representatives of the sciences of management in particular to their dual 
methodological nature, reminiscent of Max Webers own ideal types (although  
they are not ideal types themselves and they are not empirical generalizations 
either). On the one hand they allow us to study group behaviour in economic 
organizations and link it to the sociological background of group members. In 
other words, they allow a student of a homo sentiens to account for a homo 
economicus and a homo sociologicus, while using a single analytical tool  
namely the concept of the dimensions of culture, which can be applied cross-
culturally. On the other hand, they allow us to study the spatial distribution of 
clusters of behavioural recipes, scenarios or scripts, developed by human 
individuals trying to respond to varying economic and sociological contexts. A 
homo sentiens does not passively reflect a sociological background and does not 
simply respond to managerial stimulae  he or she uses both as resources to be 
recombined  creatively  in the light of values deemed worthy of preserving and 
defending.  
 
This methodological duality did not make the pioneers, for instance Geert 
Hofstedes, academic life easier. His choice of a multinational business 
organization (IBM) and of the national level of culture have often been criticized 
as arbitrary methodological decisions. Critics accused him of endorsing a national 
cultural determinism and ignoring the alternatives. Why not a shop floor level 
subculture of a working community? Why not a professional community in a 
whole branch of industry? His dimensions of national cultures were described as a 
dogmatic product of an a priori belief that influential national cultures exist 
beyond any reasonable doubt (while some authors claim that they are little more 
than imagined communities evoked by state elites to facilitate modern state 
formation). His assumption that national cultures exert a causal influence upon 
resources chosen by individuals and groups for social action (administrative, 
political, economic) has often been criticized as insufficient to comprehend, for 
instance, the religiosity of the Spaniards or atheism of the Russians without taking 
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the monopolistic position of the Catholic Church in Spain or the state-imposed 
atheism in former Soviet Union into account.  
 
There is, however, no methodological objection against accounting for the non-
cultural influences upon individual behaviour by a cross-cultural researcher.  
There is no methodological rule against accounting for a homo sociologicus, even 
if we focus on a homo sentiens, and want to keep homo economicus in the picture. 
There is no methodological taboo in cross-cultural studies against studying how: 
 
As subjects, or citizens, or partners, or employees, or whatever, we take our 
positions within the relations of power and within our understanding of those 
relations.(Kondo),(15)(16) 
 
Moreover, most of the researchers studying cross-cultural or cross-national 
differences in value priorities, have followed Hofstedian example (voting, so to 
speak, not so much with their feet as with their footnotes), stating, as Schwartz, for 
instance does, that:  
 
In tackling this broad question, we have taken whole cultural groups as our unit 
of analysis, following in the footsteps of Hofstedes monumental work(17) 
 
This homage to Hofstede is even more important if we consider the fact that 
Schwartz studies clusters of values from the point of their motivational influence 
upon a single individual in a variety of institutional settings and aggregates them 
along a different scale than Hofstedian dimensions. Thus he divides values into ten 
groups  universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, power, 
achievement, hedonism, stimulation and self-direction - and clusters them into 
compatible and incompatible sets. The compatible sets include for instance power 
and achievement (an individual who pursues those values is interested in social 
superiority and esteem) or tradition and conformity (an individual who is 
motivated by these values wants self-restraint and submission, often for spiritual, 
religious reasons). The incompatible sets would include, for instance, self-
direction and stimulation versus conformity, tradition and security or universalism 
and benevolence versus achievement and power. Then he studies students and 
teachers in China, Poland, Spain, the United States, Venezuela and Zimbabwe and 
mentions the following conclusions as meaningful: 
 
Age correlated positively with giving priority to security values and negatively 
with giving priority to hedonism values. Education correlated positively with 
emphasizing self-direction values and negatively with emphasizing tradition 
values. Religiosity correlated positively with giving priority to conformity values 
and negatively with giving priority to stimulation values. Voting for parties on the 
economic left was associated with emphasizing benevolence values and 
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deemphasizing power values. Voting for parties favourable to classical liberalism 
was associated with preferring self-direction values over conformity 
values.(ibid.) 
 
The fact that even researchers representing different methodological traditions, 
working with different dimensions of culture, assuming different mechanisms of 
motivational influence of values and studying different levels of social aggregation 
acknowledge the role of Hofstedian dimensions should not come as a surprise. The 
edifice of social sciences has changed in the wake of the paradigmatic wars and 
the postmodernist offensive. The field of cross-cultural studies has changed both 
because of what Hofstede has written and because of what has been written for 
and against him. The concept of cultural dimensions has not been formulated 
within an additional paradigm in social sciences, waiting to be admitted by 
professional gate-keepers to social psychology, sociology or managerial sciences. 
It has become a theoretical construct in an academic world without a single 
dominant paradigm. It has become a theoretical construct in a business 
management world without a ruling orthodoxy.  
 
Methodologically speaking, we live in a world in which, as George Ritzer puts it, 
multiculturalism, feminism and postmodernism have opened a Pandoras box with 
new paradigms and with a growing number of theories (each of which seems to 
have been built on shifting sand), and forced us to thrive on chaos in place of on a 
discipline deemed necessary in the pursuit of truth. This discipline used to be 
imposed by rigorous gate-keepers, but proved untenable. Even the staunchest 
defenders of the explanatory model of scientific rationality (at the expense of the 
scholarly interpretation) have finally paid their dues to those from the other side of 
the methodological barricades. Nostalgically looking back at the period of a 
dominant neopositivist paradigm in social sciences, E.O. Wilson pays this 
reluctant tribute to the postmodernists: 
 
We will always need postmodernists or their rebellious equivalents. For what 
better way to strengthen organized knowledge than continually to defend it from 
hostile forces? John Stuart Mill correctly noted that teacher and learner alike fall 
asleep at their posts when there is no enemy in the field.(18)   
 
 
 
Measuring cultural relativity; a pragmatic comment 
 
Representatives of cross-cultural studies do not have to limit themselves to 
methodological arguments alone. The relevance of their pursuits for the academic 
institutions can also be demonstrated on much more pragmatic grounds. First, 
there is a growing demand for expertise in facilitating the creation and 
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maintenance of cross-cultural governance structures in the economic, political, 
military and cultural spheres. The proliferation of training and coaching programs 
for expats in spe testifies to the relevance of cross-cultural expertise. Second, there 
is a growing need to tackle the new complexity of organizations made possible by 
new information and engendered by communication technologies. Organizations 
are able to function networking and aligning many very different sub-components 
of complex chains, allowing for much more personal discretion and group 
autonomy. Controlling, guiding and co-ordinating these complex modern 
organizations requires cross-cultural competence in dealing with subcultural 
clusters of individuals. Globally distributed teamwork is slowly becoming a rule 
rather than an exception in designing, maintaining and changing teaching and 
research products. 
 
Let us begin with the latter problem of tackling the new complexity of 
organizations and look at it at our academic home. Abandoning the normative idea 
of a single truth approximated by theoreticians of the dominant paradigm had 
consequences for the methodologies of rational pursuits, central to the identity of 
the academic communities. However, no sooner have communities of researchers 
reconciled themselves with the onset of methodological relativism, when a new 
form of pragmatic, institutional relativism has struck the very heart of the 
academic community  the organization of a university. The dividing line between 
the true professionals  academics  and the administrators of increasingly large, 
complex and bureaucratic universities has been blurred from the very beginning by 
academics temporarily abdicating their research and teaching functions and 
assuming some administrative duties as deans, rectors, research or training product 
managers, and the like. However, with the qualitative leap in complexity (many 
more students of various types, mixing of free and commercial programs, 
appearance of graduate schools of business) and with the increased pressures from 
the political bureaucracies of government and from lobbies of business 
communities, the emergence of professional managers (as deans, rectors or 
presidents of a university) has made the separation between substantively rational 
academics and formally rational bureaucrats final. One may claim that the break 
has not been so abrupt  professional managers are usually recruited from among 
the academics and thus are not blind to the substantive rationality of the profession 
as a whole. Moreover, they usually used to pursue a typical academic career 
themselves, which should have prevented them from streamlining the bureaucratic 
organization without any professional concessions. On the other hand, academics 
themselves spend at least part of their time controlling the formal rationality of 
their activities and are thus not complete strangers to the world of bureaucracy. 
However, some changes are hard to ignore. This process of professionalizing 
academic management has already contributed to a relative loss of professional 
autonomy of the academics in managing universities as incomplete formal 
bureaucracies. This has been witnessed by some changes in legal acts issued by 
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governments and regulating the functioning of the institutions of higher learning. 
Will losses of professional autonomy become even more acute in future? Will 
mergers with non-university types of schools and acquisitions of new training 
grounds accelerate bureaucratization of all academic institutions? Will they result 
in what George Ritzer calls a deprofessionalization of the academic profession  
very much after the pattern set by the medical or legal professions in the United 
States he had studied in the wake of his macdonaldization theory? Will a livable, 
teachable, learnable university (leefbare universiteit) survive? Answering 
questions like these certainly requires cross-cultural competence and an ability to 
reconcile the priorities of the culture of an academic research community with the 
values of an efficiency-based bureaucratic culture of a modern educational 
enterprise. Needless to say, these values and priorities cannot be reconciled in a 
vacuum of the ivory tower but have to be measured against the background of 
values and priorities of society at large. Some ecological or feminist postulates 
have already assumed the form of priority lists of a global society willing to 
reduce waste and decrease gender inequalities. Phrases like our university is an 
equal opportunity employer or experimental  initiatives like buy nothing day 
carry across most cultures and will probably carry through all in future. 
 
Apart from this domestic necessity to accommodate organizational change within 
academic settings there is also another pragmatic reason to devote some attention 
to cross-cultural studies. Developments in information and communication 
technologies have made us aware of the social life of data, information and 
knowledge filling the air around us and enabling us to experiment with new forms 
of organizing and changing our collective activities. Both the champions and the 
critics of globalization agree that the increased frequency of international contacts, 
trade exchanges, political clustering, cultural networking, media overlaps and the 
like require guidance and coaching. In order to guide and coach we have to 
perform an analysis of the beliefs and values of those who are involved and 
impacted by changes. It is very important to also understand those parties, which 
are either consciously excluded from the benefits of these processes or end up 
forgotten and deprived of them. Their ways of coping with their situation, their 
manner of linking a homo sentiens with a homo sociologicus and a homo 
economicus, certainly merit research attention as much as does the behaviour of 
top managers and global leaders. They also merit support  which should be 
guided by cross-cultural competence in designing this supports institutional 
frameworks and networking them around the principal values of the relevant 
communities.  
 
We do not have to search very far for opportunities to develop and test our cross-
cultural competence. History has downloaded a case in point at our doorstep and it 
is up to us to pick up this challenge. By a case in point I mean the recent 
breakdown of the state socialist system, an attempt at an alternative, non-capitalist 
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and non-democratic globalization. Signalled by the rise of the Polish Solidarity 
movement in the summer of 1980 and completed by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
the fall of 1989, this breakdown of a undemocratic and centrally-planned 
institutional cluster gave rise to numerous strategies of survival, reform and 
change in central and eastern Europe, and has put our concepts of east, west and 
best to yet another pragmatic test.  
 
 
Old “east”, old “west” and a new search for the “best” 
 
As far as this historical event is concerned, the breakdown of the state-socialist 
system dominated by the former Soviet Union made us re-define both east and 
west. Before 1989 east meant countries east of the Elbe river, east of the line 
on which the armies of the United States and of the former Soviet Union met while 
defeating Nazi Germany and west meant countries to the west of this dividing 
line. The differences were lined up in a perfect symmetry. The east had a 
Warsaw pact, while the west had a NATO. The east had a communist 
ideology, while the west had a liberal one. The east had a Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance, while the west had an European Economic Community. 
The east had a Soviet atomic umbrella, while the west had a nuclear umbrella 
provided by the United States. The east had its own Germany (GDR), while the 
west enjoyed its own (FRG). The east exported its system to the other 
continents (China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Angola, Cuba), while the west 
continued to export to its club (Japan, India, South Korea, South Vietnam, Chile). 
This symmetry has never been perfect (for instance, China broke with Russia and 
started promoting her own model of alternative globalization, India felt it was not 
rewarded for sustainable democracy by the United States, which focussed on the 
Chinese market), but it has been almost perfectly maintained by the superpowers 
in question. When Greece was assigned to the west after WWII, the pro-
communist rebels were defeated with British military assistance in 1948 and 
Soviet Union did not intervene. In return, when the east German workers rioted 
against the communist party in 1953, they were defeated by Soviet tanks and the 
west kept its part of the bargain doing nothing. In spite of the popularity of the 
communist party in Italy, it has been successfully (if not always legally) prevented 
from taking over state power and trying out the Soviet system in the "west", while 
the Hungarians (1956), the Poles (1956,1970,1981) and the Czechs (1968) have 
been repeatedly reminded that they should not try the western system in the east. 
 
The breakdown of the east in this sense came as an almost complete surprise to 
the majority of experts, academics, advisors, consultants and analysts working for 
teams, commissions, lobbies, projects, brain trusts, think tanks and other 
institutions. The almost in the above sentence refers to two independent scholars 
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and to a cross-cultural concept of human rights. Both of the scholars in question 
specialized in cross-cultural comparisons, both were historians by profession and 
both have been predicting the fall of the Soviet Union and the accompanying 
decomposition of the Soviet sphere of influence, i.e. of our latest equivalent of the 
east. They did so in the mid-1970ies. I refer, of course, to the political pamphlet 
written by the late Soviet dissident, Andrei Amalrik  Will the Soviet Union 
Survive Until 1984?(19) and to the study of a French historian and cultural 
anthropologist working in Great Britain, Emmanuel Todd  La chute finale. Essai 
sur la decomposition de la sphère soviètique(20).  
 
Mentioning human rights I refer to the Helsinki endorsement of the universal 
declaration on human rights. The Committee on European Security and 
Cooperation dates back to the 1970ies. It had been designed by government 
representatives in the wake of an attempt to reduce tensions between the 
superpowers and to reduce conventional armies in Europe. The declaration has 
been worded in a truly cross-cultural manner. It has been viewed by the Soviet 
government as a relatively minor case of ideological window dressing, a trivial 
concession on the way towards a reduction of the economic burden of further arms 
race. However, it was subsequently used by civil societies within the Soviet sphere 
of influence (including Russia proper) as a powerful instrument for conducting 
some checks of the communist governments repression of civil society and for 
defending individual citizens against totalitarian state.  
 
Both of the abovementioned authors had a research interest in cross-cultural 
issues. Amalrik had drawn the attention of Soviet censors very early in his 
academic career. He had angered the Soviet authorities with his studies of the 
Viking influences upon the early Kiev state. This clashed with the propaganda 
image of Ruthenians inventing an early state organization on their own. Forced 
into exile, Amalrik was apparently assassinated by the KGB on a highway in 
Spain, on his way to a Helsinki Committee meeting. Todd was interested in 
comparative studies of political behaviour. He tried to link types of family 
socialization (especially the degree of authoritarianism or of power distance) to the 
political behaviour of adults. Assuming that our value systems emerge in the 
course of an early socialization, he tried to link types of family upbringing to the 
extreme, often violent political behaviour in the world at large (21).  
 
Both authors have offered predictions, which were based on an analysis of values 
and preferences of human individuals living within the state socialist system. Both 
of them assessed the predicted uses of national cultural resources (including 
religious ones) against the institutional attempt at total control of civil society by 
the state. Both have put forward the hypothesis that an economy based on 
enterprises destroying value instead of creating it cannot sustain a strong state and 
an effective system of repression. They claimed that the Soviet empire would 
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dissolve into nation-states, since when individuals within it acquire a free choice 
(which they are bound to do as the system deteriorates)  they will identify with 
their national culture rather than with the artificial and unattractive ideal of a  
homo sovieticus. What made both authors different from the majority of social 
scientists formulating hypotheses on the Soviet  dominated east? It was the 
fact, that they did not consider a slow, gradual decline (the ottomanization of the 
Soviet Union and its satellites) as much more probable than a rapid desintegration. 
They both had the courage to state that the end of the Soviet empire, the 
decomposition of its structures, was imminent and inevitable. Their hypotheses 
have been verified within two decades of their formulation. While the present-day 
Russian economy is not yet as transparent as the market ones, it has become much 
more accessible to researchers. Looking at the aftermath of the half-hearted market 
reforms and at the Russian repetition of the Soviet dilemma, the economists thus 
state bluntly in 2001: 
 
The Russian economy remains a hyperindustrialized system composed of 
enterprises that would not be viable in the market economy, supported by transfers 
from the energy and raw materials sectors.(22) 
 
The difference made by both authors focus on cross-cultural values is that they 
did not assume, as most of their contemporaries did, that a strong and repressive 
state would simply transfer energy and raw materials without any constraints in 
order to maintain the system, i.e. itself. They have thus prognosed a systemic 
collapse on the basis of a hypothesis involving homo sentiens rather than homo 
economicus or homo sociologicus and have focussed on the role of national 
culture as a crucial resource for individual and group action. 
 
 
The future of “east”, “west” and “best” 
 
The role of cross cultural studies in making the world safe for many easts, 
wests and bests does not end there. Let us therefore ask what future research 
in the cross-cultural area could add to our competence in dealing with some or all 
of them. First, research on national cultures  a continuation of the Hofstedian 
project  could bring us closer towards an understanding of the influence of 
imagined communities(23) on actual societies and states. What do we need to 
predict the behaviour of the former members of the Yugoslav federation or of  
present-day Russia and her Community of Independent States? What do we need 
to decide whether the European Union should accept Turkey as a member state? 
Which policy should European Union employ with respect to immigrants, mostly 
from one of many easts or one of many souths? What should we do with a 
female employee of a Dutch court of law, or with a female student of a Belgian 
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school who wants to cover her head in Muslim fashion? One can see that cross-
cultural studies, with a special focus on national identity are staging a modest 
comeback in the political sciences, and are at the heart of our explanations of the 
easts: 
 
The emotional, albeit irrational, sense of nation and national identity plays a vital 
role in forming a societys perception of its environment and is an extremely 
important, if not driving, force behind the parameters of what a polity considers its 
national interests at home and abroad.(24) 
 
Second, the breakdown of the Soviet-dominated, politically and militarily defined  
east has also made it clear that there are many wests. Kennichi Ohmae has 
started splitting the west into the triad of the United States with a Southern 
American economic hinterland, the European Union with central and eastern 
Europe as an expansion area and the middle east with northern Africa as an 
economic hinterland and Japan with a string of south-east Asian countries as its 
economic hinterland. Please note that Japan, formerly classified as Far East, has 
been relabelled as one of the three key versions of the west. Many Latin 
American politicians and economists hesitate between a European model of the 
market economy  parliamentary democracy mix and the US variant of the same, 
with the Dutch polder model as a showcase of the difference. Europeans 
themselves are also increasingly contesting the present shape of the European 
Union as too slow in coordinating national governments. The project of a new type 
of a continental federation suggested by the present German minister of foreign 
affairs, Joshka Fischer, possibly signals a new phase of this political, cultural and 
economic process. Some politicians point out that an eastward expansion of the 
EU might be a historical opportunity to modernize, upgrade, change and develop 
this institutional shell  in tune with the values shaping the preferences of the 
Europeans. Thus, not only is the west a chance for the former close east, the 
admission of the countries of a former close east becomes a chance for the 
redefinition and modernization of the west according to changing preferences.  
 
But what are those preferences? How can we come to know and implement them 
at all levels of social processes? Do our organizations reflect them? For instance, 
are we, academics, happy with the present form of the university? Do our 
politicians express them adequately when formulating party programs, creating 
new political parties or announcing referenda? Are these values compatible, 
reconcilable, is their implementation manageable? How can we increase our 
competence in dealing with conflicts of values? Again, a cross-cultural analysis 
appears to offer important clues as to the multiple wests, both real and imagined. 
 
Finally, our ideas on the best also evolve. Values, norms and preferences make 
us believe that a certain action, a certain way of life, a certain cultural identity and 
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a certain institutional form are best for us and for some or all others. However, 
there are many bests at present as well. My colleague, Richard Whitley, 
compared the national recipes for the successful development of new technologies 
in a space of university researchers, corporate producers, government legislators 
and financial networks. He came up with national clusters of German, Japanese, 
British and US-American models of the best clustering of resarchers, producers, 
legislators, and of marketing and financial organizations. Resources are similar, 
institutions comparable, technologies the same  what makes them different, 
however, are cross-culturally perceivable preferences, choices, routines, and 
visions of the best solution to the problem of managing technological progress. 
A Silicon Valley model changes on its way to southern Bavaria, Tokyo or 
Cambridge (not to mention Thailand, Brazil or Kenya) and a cross-cultural 
comparison offers us insights into the underlying cultural processes of crucial 
policy choices and organizational design preferences.  
 
Are we getting closer to recognize this volatile and mutable nature of bestness? 
Are we getting closer to a European definition of a flexible cultural identity based 
on multiple inclusions? Can representatives of the cross-cultural research 
community offer a clue as o the best way of dealing with the variety of cultural 
backgrounds of individuals and societies? They obviously try, suggesting that the 
future belongs to someone who is: 
 
a person capable of mediating between national traditions, communities of fate 
and alternative forms of life. Citizenship in a democratic polity of the future, it is 
argued, is likely to involve a growing mediating role: a role which encompasses 
dialogue with the traditions and discourses of others with the aim of expanding the 
horizons of ones own framework of meaning, and increasing the scope of mutual 
understanding.(25) 
 
They try, but do they succeed? Can their focus on homo sentiens yield better 
results than the previously tried focus on homo economicus or homo sociologicus? 
Can cross-cultural studies equip cross-cultural managers in business, politics and 
culture with better toolboxes for negotiating the best best for our future?  
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Ladies and gentlemen, let me suspend the answer to the last question and express 
my thanks: first, to Joanna, my wife, and our children, Magdalena and Jacek. Their 
support, sense of humour, patience and genuine warmth, have been, and still are, 
crucial to me.  
 
Second, I would like to pay homage to the pioneer of the cross-cultural study of 
organizations. Together with Johan Huizinga, Geert Hofstede represents for me 
the Dutch face of social sciences. I feel honoured by your presence today, dear 
Geert. I am also grateful to my American colleague, George Ritzer, who studies 
the macdonaldization of society to re-enchant the disenchanted world. Thank you 
for joining us. I would also like to thank Immanuel Wallerstein (who unfortunately 
could not come) for teaching me how to put cross-cultural comparisons in a 
historical and systemic perspective. Needless to say, I am also grateful to many 
other researchers from Dutch, Polish, German, Danish, Austrian, Swedish, French, 
British, Italian, Spanish and American universities and research centers, of whom I 
would particularly like to mention Martin Jay from Berkeley in the USA and Mats 
Alvesson from Lund in Sweden, thanking them for setting me on critical 
theoretical tracks at the 1988 conference, and for coming.  
 
Third, I would like to thank my distinguished colleagues from Erasmus University, 
who have all contributed to the creation of a right mix of teaching, research and 
sociability. I would like to thank our Rector Magnificus, prof. dr Jan van Bemmel, 
for forgetting high office and joining us in a heated argument with our Ph.D. 
students. Let me also thank the dean of our faculty, prof. dr Paul Verhaegen. Dear 
Paul, thank you very much for running a challenging faculty with a human face. 
Kai Peters, dean of the RSM enabled me to see how different these faces could be 
in international programs. Thank you. I would also like to thank the economists, 
all colleagues of mine: prof. dr Bart Nooteboom for his inspiring attempts to find 
what is best in exploring and exploiting knowledge, prof. dr Barbara Krug for 
her unwavering attempts to convince me that the only true east is in China, prof. 
dr Arjo Klamer for his companionship and attempts to redefine the values of a true 
west in an academic and political world, and prof. dr Joop Stam for his placing 
the best east in Japan. The list of colleagues I would like to thank is too long to 
include in the present address. 
 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my students, past and present, inspiring 
and troublesome. Without your hot breath on our necks, we would have become 
bureaucrats long ago. Thank you very much. Dank U wel. Dziękuję bardzo.     
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